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THE CHALLENGE OF IMPROVING THE 
LONG-TERM FOCUS OF 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
David I. Walker*
Abstract: A consensus is developing that executive compensation in the 
United States is inadequately linked to long-term company performance, 
resulting in reckless, short-term decision making. Congress, the Obama 
administration, and academic commentators have recently embraced 
dramatic restrictions on the form and holding period of senior executive 
pay, at least for some companies. A common view is that although regula-
tion of the amount of executive pay would do more harm than good, regu-
lation of form and term is desirable. This Article questions that view. It 
highlights the challenges of fruitfully regulating the form and term of pay 
arising from the complexity and diversity of executive pay arrangements, 
uncertainty as to the underlying reasons and hence appropriate remedies 
for short-termism, and the conflict between deterring reckless short-term 
behavior and encouraging sufficient risk-taking to maximize share value 
over the long term. It analyzes and critiques existing regulatory proposals, 
and, although not endorsing a regulatory solution, offers two ideas that 
policy makers should consider if faced with crafting a regulatory response 
to short-termism: first, focusing regulation solely on the term of pay, leav-
ing form to company discretion, and second, adopting a comprehensive 
disclosure-based response. 
Introduction 
 Executive compensation in the United States is under intense 
scrutiny by legislators, regulators, and investor advocates. Excessive or 
poorly structured compensation arrangements have been blamed for 
the U.S. financial crisis of 2008, as well as the malfeasance in recent 
years at Enron, WorldCom, and other major American corporations.1 A 
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1 See, e.g., Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Op-Ed., Are Executives Paid Too Much?, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (attributing the financial crisis to short-term thinking, 
driven in part by compensation plan design). 
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key complaint is that executive compensation is insufficiently focused 
on the long term, leading to reckless, short-term decision making by 
executives, and, at the extreme, financial bubbles that inevitably burst 
with negative consequences extending far beyond the employees and 
shareholders of the companies directly involved.2
 After years of much rhetoric but little action, it appears that the 
federal government may be poised to take meaningful steps to increase 
executive compensation regulation. Moreover, combating short-
termism appears to be high on the agenda. The federal bailout legisla-
tion passed in early 2009 specifies that incentive compensation granted 
to senior executives must be in the form of restricted stock that may not 
vest until the government loans are repaid,3 and influential members 
of Congress advocate broader application of rules tying executive pay 
to long-term performance.4 Academic commentators seem to agree. 
Even some commentators who do not favor capping the amount of ex-
ecutive compensation favor restrictions on the form and term of execu-
tive pay.5 For example, Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano 
have recently recommended that 85–90% of executive incentive pay 
take the form of restricted stock or restricted stock options that cannot 
be sold or exercised during employment or for two to four years follow-
ing termination.6 To be sure, Bhagat and Romano only propose man-
dating such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds; otherwise, they 
would leave the decision to individual boards of directors.7 On the 
other hand, Judge Richard Posner has recently advocated that firms be 
required to deliver a minimum percentage of chief executive officer 
(“CEO”) pay in the form of restricted stock that could not be sold for 
some specified number of years.8
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. 
3 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 
Stat. 115, 516–18. 
4 See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance, Wall St. 
J., Mar. 13, 2009, at C1 (relating comments of U.S. House of Representatives Financial 
Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank). 
5 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Essay, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing 
and Committing to the Long-term, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 359, 361 (2009); Richard A. Posner, 
Essay, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 
Duke L.J. 1013, 1045–46 (2009). 
6 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 363, 368–69. 
7 See id. at 361. Bhagat and Romano do, however, suggest extending a mandatory regime 
to all FDIC-insured institutions. See id. at 367; see also Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (advo-
cating that executives be required to hold “a significant portion of their equity for a period 
beyond their tenure,” but not suggesting that such a rule be mandated). 
8 See Posner, supra note 5, at 1045–46. 
2010] The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay 437 
 Of course, company directors can be encouraged to link executive 
pay more closely to long-term performance, but given the current push 
for more coercive measures, this Article considers the possible role of 
federal regulation in deterring reckless behavior, earnings manipula-
tion, and other pathologies associated with short-termism. It is not con-
cerned specifically with compensation at bailed-out firms, or even at 
financial firms generally, but with broadly applicable executive pay 
regulation that could or should follow from the current crisis.9
 Part I of this Article examines the complex question of why and to 
what extent short-termism exists.10 It discusses possible explanations 
including market myopia, managerial myopia, and the effects of exter-
nalities and past regulatory efforts. 
 Part II details five generic challenges to any regulatory interven-
tion aimed at combating short-termism.11 It argues that attempting to 
regulate the form and term of executive compensation is as challeng-
ing as attempting to regulate the amount. Any regulatory response 
would have to consider the uncertainty as to the underlying reasons 
(and hence appropriate remedies) for short-termism, and the potential 
conflict between deterring reckless short-term behavior and encourag-
ing sufficient risk taking to maximize share value over the long term.12 
Such a response would also have to account for the substantial com-
plexity and diversity of current executive pay arrangements as well as 
the possibility of circumvention and other unintended consequences.13 
As an example of the conflict between deterring recklessness while en-
couraging sufficient risk taking, consider a rule that would force execu-
tives to hold a creditor risk in their companies until retirement. Such a 
rule might be an excellent way of deterring earnings manipulation and 
bet-the-company risks but might cause executives to act too conserva-
tively, undermining long-term value maximization. 
 Part III then examines five existing programs and proposals for 
combating short-termism, revealing several serious concerns that sug-
                                                                                                                      
9 As Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues: “Compensation design in financial firms can 
have systemic effects” that call for a distinct and specific regulatory approach. See Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Essay, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Share-
holder Opt-In, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 323, 363–66 (2009) (proposing compensation struc-
tures that force employees of financial firms to internalize the risks they create). 
10 See infra notes 19–44 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 45–94 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 48–61 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 62–94 and accompanying text. 
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gest that these approaches may not be suitable as models for executive 
pay regulation generally.14 For example: 
• Approaches that would restrict incentive pay to one or two equity-
based instruments would eliminate valuable diversity in executive 
pay arrangements, barring not only short-term incentives, but also 
non-equity arrangements that tie executive wealth to firm per-
formance over the long term. 
• Approaches that would require executives to hold equity until re-
tirement would impose significant burdens on executives in terms 
of reduced liquidity and under-diversification. These burdens 
would increase the wedge between the cost of equity incentives to 
shareholders and  their value to executives. 
• In order to avoid circumvention, approaches that would restrict 
the term of incentive pay must be tightly circumscribed, e.g., by 
capping the amount of non-incentive pay or specifying a percent-
age of pay that must be in the form of long-term incentives. As a 
result, existing proposals either impose inefficient one-size-fits-all 
solutions on diverse firms, industries, and executives or are easily 
circumvented.15 
 Finally, Part IV of this Article considers how federal regulation di-
rected at short-termism might be shaped to increase the chances that 
the benefits would outweigh the harms.16 After all, some additional 
regulation may be inevitable, and relatively less coercive regulation 
might even be desirable. Part IV, therefore, offers two ideas for combat-
ing short-termism. First, it argues that policy makers should consider 
focusing regulation solely on the term of pay while leaving the choice 
of instrument to individual companies in order to preserve as much 
efficient diversity in pay arrangements as possible.17 Term-only regula-
tion is not unambiguously preferable to existing proposals because of 
the risk that it would result in excessive conservatism, but it would get 
at the root of the current short-termism concern and is an option that 
should be on the table if regulation is to be pursued. Second, depend-
ing on the ultimate source of the short-termism phenomenon, disclo-
sure-based regulation focused on the average holding period of execu-
tive pay could help mitigate the worst examples of short-termism while 
                                                                                                                      
14 See infra notes 95–160 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 95–160 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 161–175 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 164–169 and accompanying text. 
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avoiding many of the costs and unintended consequences of compul-
sory regulation.18
 The bottom line is that regulating the term of executive pay is no 
less challenging than regulating the amount and may not be worth un-
dertaking. Legislators, regulators, and other observers may be frus-
trated by this situation, but it is important that they recognize the po-
tential pitfalls. 
I. What Is Short-Termism, and Why Does It Exist? 
 Perhaps the leading corporate governance concern of legislators 
and commentators at present is the reckless pursuit of short-term prof-
its by corporate executives who will have cashed out before the long-
term repercussions are felt. The pathology sometimes appears in the 
form of earnings manipulation, which often involves sacrificing long-
term share value to boost near-term earnings.19 Enron Corp., where 
earnings manipulation was practiced as an art and eventually evolved 
into fraud leading to bankruptcy, is the poster child for this branch of 
short-termism.20 Short-termism, however, often takes the form of com-
pletely legal, but excessively risky behavior, such as banks adopting lax 
lending standards or financial firms taking on too much exposure to 
derivatives. Aspen Institute Business and Society Program founder Ju-
dith Samuelson and Professor Lynn Stout have argued that the “over-
arching cause” of the 2008 financial crisis was “business leaders taking 
on excessive risk in the quest to increase next quarter’s profits.”21 To be 
clear, the concern is not just that executives fail to establish sufficient 
risk controls, but that executives affirmatively seek out high risk, high 
short-term return strategies.22
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See infra notes 170–175 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, Fin. 
Analysts J., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 27, 31 (reporting results of a survey of over 400 chief fi-
nancial officers indicating that over half of respondents were willing to sacrifice share-
holder value in order to achieve earnings targets). 
20 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 9–11 
(2003) (describing Enron’s abusive use of mark-to-market accounting and special purpose 
entities to manipulate earnings). 
21 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1. 
22 Although earnings manipulation and reckless risk taking may be viewed as two ma-
nifestations of a common phenomenon, their remedies may be quite different. For exam-
ple, clawback provisions in executive compensation agreements that allow firms to recoup 
bonuses paid based on inaccurate financial results that are later restated may be an effec-
tive means of combating earnings manipulation but would not mitigate excessive risk tak-
ing. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B) (West 2001, Supp. 2009 & Supp. I 2009) (requir-
ing TARP participants to have provisions in place for the recovery “of any bonus, retention 
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 Why does short-termism allegedly run rampant in corporate board 
rooms? Most commentators point to short-term accounting-based bo-
nuses that incent managers to maximize current-year profits at the ex-
pense of long-term share value23 and short-vesting stock options that 
cause managers to prefer strategies that increase stock price volatility, 
even if those strategies do not maximize expected returns. But com-
pensation arrangements can only be a proximate cause; they cannot be 
an ultimate cause of short-termism. Why are compensation arrange-
ments too short-term focused? As we will see in this Part, that is a very 
complex question, and its elusiveness is one reason that combating 
short-termism is so difficult.24
A. Market Myopia 
 One possible explanation for short-term focused compensation 
arrangements is that these arrangements reflect myopic investor pref-
erences.25 Shareholders, in other words, do not want managers to focus 
on the long term any more than they already do. Indeed, Samuelson 
and Stout argue that “institutional and individual investors alike [have 
become] preoccupied with quarterly earnings forecasts and short-term 
share price changes.”26
 However, in order for the stock market as a whole to exhibit myo-
pia—that is, to account for myopia existing in an environment popu-
lated with sophisticated arbitrageurs—one must posit a market imper-
fection, such as information asymmetry, which leads to systematic 
discounting of long-term opportunities.27 Although it is certainly plau-
sible that investors would have relatively greater difficulty evaluating 
managerial claims regarding the costs and benefits of long-term pro-
                                                                                                                      
award, or incentive compensation paid to [specified executives and employees] based on 
statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to be materi-
ally inaccurate”). 
23 See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in Corporate 
Restructuring and Executive Compensation 3, 10–11 ( Joel M. Stern et al. eds., 1989). 
24 See infra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. 
25 On market and managerial myopia, see Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, In-
efficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. Econ. 655 (1989) [hereinafter 
Stein, Efficient Capital Markets]; Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 
J. Pol. Econ. 61 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats]; Brian Cadman & Jayanthi 
Sunder, The Role of Investor Horizon on Compensation Horizon (Sept. 1, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956601). 
26 Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1. 
27 See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 25, at 62–63. 
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jects,28 empirical evidence concerning the existence of market myopia 
is mixed.29 Of course, if the market is myopic, one would expect execu-
tive compensation arrangements to reflect this myopia and to focus 
excessively on current earnings generation. 
B. Managerial Myopia 
 Even if markets are not inherently myopic, managers might be. 
First, managers might believe that the market is myopic and shape their 
own behavior accordingly.30 Second, consistent with a model developed 
by Professor Jeremy Stein, managers might rationally behave myopically 
as a result of a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, in which they are trapped in 
myopic behavior even if they know that the market would be efficient 
in equilibrium.31 Third, in some cases, managers might have a shorter 
investment horizon than shareholders because they expect to retire or 
leave the company in the near term and hence are not motivated to 
pursue long-term goals.32
 In these situations, managerial and investor preferences are not 
aligned, and one must invoke agency costs to explain why managers 
would be allowed to act on their myopic preferences. Suppose the mar-
ket is not inherently myopic, but managers are. In order to overcome 
managerial myopia, managerial wealth should be tied to firm perform-
ance over the longer term, which, in the view of finance theorists, helps 
explain vesting requirements on stock and options, and long-term in-
                                                                                                                      
28 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (“It is extremely difficult for an outside investor 
to gauge whether a company is making sound, long-term investments by training employ-
ees, improving customer service, or developing promising new products.”). 
29 The empirical evidence on both market and managerial myopia is inconclusive. It 
has been suggested that the growth of private equity buyouts, which free firms to focus on 
long-term gains, is some evidence of market myopia. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1086 
(2007). Others point to positive stock market reaction to long-term investment as evidence 
against market myopia. See Jensen, supra note 23, at 10–12. Professor Jeremy Stein notes, 
however, that such behavior is consistent with managerial myopia since shareholders will 
highly value new investment approved by managers who are generally reluctant to invest. 
See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 25, at 77. 
30 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 865 (1992) (arguing that corporate managers may think institu-
tional investors are myopic leading “managers to behave myopically, in the misguided be-
lief that doing so will placate institutional hunger for a quick buck”). 
31 See Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 25, at 656–61 (positing model in which 
current earnings signal future earnings, firms inflate current earnings to signal future pros-
pects, investors discount current earnings accordingly, but no firm can credibly defect). 
32 See Black, supra note 30, at 865. 
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centive plans with multi-year horizons.33 But managers resist having too 
much of their wealth tied to long-term performance because of the 
negative effects on the diversification of their portfolios and liquidity. 
The optimal pay arrangement would balance the shareholders’ desire 
for long-term incentives against managerial risk aversion and liquidity 
concerns. As a result, even the optimal pay arrangement would be 
more short-term focused than shareholders would prefer.34
 In addition, managers have every incentive to reduce their risk 
exposure, below the level ostensibly agreed to, by negotiating hard on 
seemingly insignificant details of their compensation, such as vesting 
schedules ex ante, and through hedging, backdating option grants, and 
similar schemes ex post.35 If one is a fervent believer that corporate 
boards of directors faithfully and capably represent shareholder inter-
ests and that executive pay arrangements reflect optimal contracting, 
there would be less of a reason to worry about inadequate term from 
the shareholders’ perspective. If, however, one believes that managers 
exert significant control over their own pay packages, one would expect 
pay arrangements to be appreciably short-term focused.36
                                                                                                                      
33 See Cadman & Sunder, supra note 25, at 6–7 (citing sources). 
34 Cf. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Ma-
nagerial Compensation, 38 RAND J. Econ. 698, 701, 707 (2007) (demonstrating that in a 
hidden action model, in which managers take actions to increase profits that are never 
observed by shareholders, the optimal managerial compensation contract would permit 
some earnings manipulation). 
35 At the extreme, hedging transactions can completely eliminate firm-specific risk. See 
David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibil-
ity, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 455 (2000). As a result of backdating, executives effectively 
replaced risky at-the-money options, issued with an exercise price equal to the fair market 
value of the stock on the grant date, with less risky in-the-money options that had an exer-
cise price lower than the market value on the grant date. See David I. Walker, Unpacking 
Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 
561, 570–76 (2007). 
36 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 774–79 (2002) (proposing a managerial 
power theory of the executive pay setting process). Under a managerial power view of the 
executive compensation-setting process, pay is capped in part by investor outrage, and 
managers therefore seek out low-salience means of boosting their pay. See id. at 786–91. 
One way to subtly increase the value of a pay package is to decrease its risk, and shortening 
the term of equity and non-equity incentives is one way to decrease risk. See id. at 828 (dis-
cussing broad manager freedom to exercise options well before expiration as an incon-
spicuous way to increase value). 
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C. Externalities 
 Next, even if the capital markets accurately and efficiently gauge 
short- and long-term opportunities and risks, pay arrangements might 
be too short-term focused from a social perspective. Not all of the costs 
that result from myopic firm behavior are borne by parties to the con-
tracts, at least not in the cases in which short-termism has been taken to 
an extreme. At Enron, at WorldCom, and certainly at the banks at the 
center of the subprime mortgage-sparked financial crisis, a significant 
portion of the cost has been borne by employees who own few shares, 
by suppliers, by the communities at large, and in some cases by taxpay-
ers. If the shareholders and the managers retain between them a larger 
fraction of the gains from short-term, risky behavior when such behav-
ior pays off than they do of the costs when things go wrong, one would 
expect firms to take on more risk and for pay packages to be more 
short-term focused than would be optimal for society as a whole.37
D. Regulatory Push 
 Finally, past regulation of executive pay may have encouraged 
short-termism by promoting compensation in the form of stock op-
tions. First, although by the early 1990s accountants were generally of 
the view that the cost of stock options should be recognized as an ex-
pense for financial accounting purposes, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board failed to mandate option expensing until 2004.38 Prior 
to this, options were uniquely free goods from an accounting perspec-
tive, whereas the compensation alternatives—restricted stock, account-
ing-based incentives, and, of course, salary—all resulted in an expense 
under generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).39
                                                                                                                      
37 This, of course, is the standard problem associated with negative externalities. See 
generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (discussing efficient 
ways to distribute risk of harm between businesses and society). 
38 See Fin. Acct. Std. Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
123: Share-Based Payment, at iii–iv, 1 (revised 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R] (requiring 
“fair value” accounting for all equity compensation including options); Fin. Acct. Std. 
Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123: Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation 17–18 (1995) (requiring firms to present pro forma income 
statements including option expense, but not mandating fair value accounting for op-
tions). 
39 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 927, 953–57 (2007) (discussing the accounting treatment of options and implica-
tions). See generally William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 5 (2007). 
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 Second, in promulgating Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) 
§ 162(m) in 1993, Congress encouraged firms to redirect executive 
salaries into options.40 Section 162(m)limits tax deductions for certain 
senior executive compensation to $1 million per year but provides an 
exception for performance-based pay, and the regulations made it easy 
to qualify conventional stock options as fully deductible executive com-
pensation.41 Both of these decisions made stock options particularly 
attractive as a compensation device and may have contributed to over-
use.42
 The accounting treatment of options has now been rationalized, 
and aggregate use of options by U.S. companies is much reduced versus 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.43 That change may have already re-
duced short-termism pressure to some extent, but many companies 
continue to rely heavily on stock option compensation for their most 
senior executives.44
II. Five Generic Challenges to a Regulatory Response  
to Short-Termism 
 This Part explores five generic challenges to regulatory interven-
tion aimed at combating short-termism that might be underappreci-
ated by regulators or commentators.45 Part III will then consider several 
specific approaches to regulating the link between executive pay and 
long-term firm performance based on the 2009 economic stimulus leg-
islation and suggestions of commentators.46 It will be shown that each 
has serious shortcomings as a model for general coercive regulation.47
                                                                                                                      
40 See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009). 
41 See id. § 162(m)(1), (4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (as amended in 1996) 
(deeming conventional non-discounted options and stock appreciation rights (“SARs”) to 
qualify as performance-based pay if certain minimal procedural requirements are satisfied). 
42 See Walker, supra note 39, at 953–57 (discussing anecdotal and empirical evidence 
that the anomalous accounting treatment of options was a primary factor in their growing 
use in the 1990s). 
43 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting 18 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 09-34, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443170 (documenting that stock 
option compensation, including SARs, constituted over 60% of the aggregate ex ante com-
pensation of S&P 500 senior executives in 2000, and showing that by 2007 the fraction had 
declined to 25%). 
44 See id. at 27–28 (documenting that 17% of S&P 500 senior executives received op-
tions as their only equity incentives in 2007). 
45 See infra notes 48–94 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 95–160 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 95–160 and accompanying text. 
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A. Uncertain Source and Extent Equals Uncertain Remedy 
 As discussed above, there are several factors that may have con-
tributed to short-term behavior.48 Moreover, although theory suggests 
that short-termism could be systemic, there is much uncertainty regard-
ing the pervasiveness and significance of the problem. Discussion of 
short-termism tends to focus on the failings of specific firms such as 
Enron, WorldCom, and AIG, but thousands of public companies in the 
United States exhibit no signs of pathological short-term behavior. Fur-
thermore, the author is aware of no empirical evidence establishing 
that executive pay term is inadequately focused on long-term perform-
ance from either a shareholder or a societal perspective, systemically.49
 This uncertainty increases the difficulty of shaping a regulatory 
remedy. For example, if short-termism is primarily the result of market 
myopia or externalities, a coercive response might be indicated. Pre-
sumably, company directors would need to be prodded to take steps 
contrary to the priorities of their executives and their shareholders. If, 
however, managerial agency problems and compensation opacity are 
the key contributors, improved disclosure could be a reasonable first 
step towards combating short-termism.50 Similarly, if short-termism is 
                                                                                                                      
 
48 See supra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. 
49 There is, however, empirical evidence linking earnings management with strong equity 
incentives. See, e.g., Pengjie Gao & Ronald E. Shrieves, Earnings Management and Executive 
Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary? 26 ( July 29, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=302843) (finding a positive 
relationship between earnings management intensity and option and bonus amounts and 
incentive intensity of current year stock option awards); Bin Ke, Do Equity-Based Incentives 
Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earnings Increases? 2–3 
( July 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=446540) 
(finding that firms whose CEOs have high equity-based incentives are more likely to manage 
earnings). On the other hand, evidence of a link between executive compensation design 
and accounting fraud is mixed. See Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 34, at 699–700 (reviewing 
the literature). 
To the author’s knowledge, no one has studied the relationship between equity or incen-
tive compensation vesting periods and governance, although that relationship would seem to 
be central to this issue. Perhaps variation in vesting periods is inadequate to produce statisti-
cally significant results, but although modest, there is some variation in equity compensation 
vesting periods from firm to firm. See Frederick W. Cook & Co., The 2008 Top 250: Long-
Term Incentive Grant Practices for Executives 17 (2008), http://www.fwcook.com/ 
alert_letters/2008_Top_250.pdf. Options vest in three years at roughly half of large U.S. com-
panies, in four years at about 30% of firms, and in five years at about 15% of companies. Id. 
50 U.S. public companies routinely claim that their executive compensation programs are 
designed to ensure a focus on long-term shareholder value. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 23 (Mar. 10, 2008) (stating that “compensation should foster 
a long-term focus”). Indeed, proxy materials often specifically assert an emphasis on long-
term incentives over short-term incentives. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement 
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systemic, this suggests more coercive regulation is necessary; if, however, 
it is limited to a subset of firms, less coercive regulation may be in order. 
 The federal government has never attempted strongly coercive 
regulation of executive pay. Previous regulation generally has taken the 
form of tax incentives and disclosure requirements.51 As will be dis-
cussed, strongly coercive regulation carries significant risks and costs, 
which may be difficult to justify without more certainty regarding the 
source and extent of the problem.52
B. Mitigating Short-Termism and Avoiding Excessive Managerial 
Conservatism May Be in Tension 
 Interestingly, although corporate finance researchers have long 
been concerned with executive appetites for risk, their focus has gener-
ally been on the problem of excessive conservatism on the part of risk-
averse executives.53 Because executives’ human capital and often a dis-
proportionate amount of their financial capital is tied up in their firms, 
executives are inherently more risk averse than diversified sharehold-
ers.54 As a result, executives would tend to be more conservative than 
shareholders would prefer them to be in selecting projects, making ac-
quisition decisions, etc., and fail to maximize the long-term value of the 
enterprise.55 Of course, this conservatism problem is much more subtle 
than the recklessness problem that is the center of attention today. 
Nothing blows up if executives are too conservative. 
 Paying executives with restricted stock, which increases exposure 
to employer share price, tends to increase risk aversion and conserva-
tism.56 On the other hand, the lack of personal downside risk and the 
tremendous upside potential provided by stock options can increase 
                                                                                                                      
(Form DEF 14A), at 27, 46 (Mar. 12, 2008) (claiming that its targeted CEO “pay mix” consists 
of 70% long-term incentives, but excluding from the calculation about $3 million of perks 
and other benefits received by the CEO during the fiscal year). As will be shown, however, 
given the complexity and diversity of modern executive compensation programs, claims such 
as these are difficult to assess objectively utilizing existing proxy disclosures. See infra notes 
62–76 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 80–94 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 105–160 and accompanying text. 
53 See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 
FRBNY Econ. Pol’y Rev., Apr. 2003, at 27, 33 (summarizing research). 
54 See, e.g., id.; Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on 
Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. Fin. 617, 618 (1990). 
55 See Core et al., supra note 53, at 33; DeFusco et al., supra note 54, at 618. 
56 See Core et al., supra note 53, at 33. 
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executive appetites for taking on risk at the firm level.57 This is the tra-
ditional corporate finance explanation for the inclusion of options in 
executive compensation packages.58
 The tension between mitigating recklessness and avoiding exces-
sive conservatism is obvious. Although options can induce executives to 
take share value-enhancing risks, they can lead to excessive risk taking 
and earnings manipulation in imperfect capital markets that fail to 
completely and instantly incorporate these activities into share prices.59 
Forcing executives to hold restricted stock until retirement would miti-
gate earnings manipulation and bet-the-company risk taking, but, as 
noted, stockholdings actually increase executive risk aversion and con-
servatism.60 Avoiding recklessness and excessive conservatism requires 
a very fine balancing act that would seem to be quite difficult to achieve 
with one-size-fits-all regulation.61
C. Existing Executive Compensation Arrangements Are Complex and Diverse 
 Executive pay arrangements are more complex and diverse than is 
generally recognized. Some of the complexity and diversity may be un-
necessary, but there is evidence that the diversity increases the effi-
ciency of executive pay arrangements. As this section explains, that di-
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. (noting that it is optimal to add options to a manager’s compensation pack-
age when the manager’s project selection choices affect firm risk). Options do not neces-
sarily cause managers to seek risk, however. See Jennifer N. Carpenter, Does Option Compen-
sation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?, 55 J. Fin. 2311, 2311 (2000). Options have an 
incentive effect, as described in the text, but they can also produce a risk aversion effect. 
See id. at 2311–12. An option that is far in the money, for example, resembles restricted 
stock and may discourage risk taking. Moreover, whether the incentive effect or risk aver-
sion effect dominates depends on the risk aversion “profile” of the manager. See id. at 
2311–13; Core et al., supra note 53, at 33; Thomas Hemmer et al., Introducing Convexity into 
Optimal Compensation Contracts, 28 J. Acct. & Econ. 307, 308–10 (2000). 
58 See, e.g., Hemmer et al., supra note 57, at 308 (“It is often claimed that the advantage of 
stock options is that they mitigate excessive risk avoiding behavior on the part of managers.”). 
59 Cf. Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 34, at 700, 707 (showing that when managers can 
conceal actions and information from shareholders, a compensation contract based on 
reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits 
and report them honestly). 
60 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
61 Although the conservatism problem is not inherently a long-term or short-term 
phenomenon, there are long-term and short-term aspects. Excessively risk-averse execu-
tives tend to prefer shorter-term, more incremental projects, such as cost cutting, which 
are relatively safe, to longer-term research and development intensive projects, which are 
relatively risky. Thus, conservatism could be viewed as a second and conflicting “short-
termism” problem. In order to avoid confusion, however, this Article refers to the latter 
problem as conservatism and reserves the short-termism label for recklessness. 
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versity makes one-size-fits-all approaches to combating short-termism 
problematic. 
 It is quite common today for a senior executive of a Standard & 
Poor’s (“S&P”) 500 company to receive base salary; one or more annual 
bonus opportunities; various equity-based and cash-based long-term in-
centive pay grants, such as restricted stock, stock options, performance 
shares, stock appreciation rights (“SARs”), and long-term incentive plan 
(“LTIP”) units;62 as well as supplemental retirement contributions, and 
various other perks and benefits. As a result of this complexity, the dis-
cussion and analysis section of proxy statements detailing this compen-
sation now routinely runs twenty to thirty pages.63
 Not only are executive pay practices complex; they are also increas-
ingly diverse among firms. Comparing the pay of executives at different 
firms had become so difficult that in 2006 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) began requiring companies to disclose a bottom 
line total compensation figure for each senior executive whose pay is 
detailed in the firm’s proxy statement.64
 Executive incentive pay arrangements, in particular, have become 
much more varied over the last decade. Ten years ago, conventional 
stock options dominated the landscape at U.S. public companies,65 but 
                                                                                                                      
62 For more detail on these instruments and their use by the largest U.S. public com-
panies, see Frederick W. Cook & Co., supra note 49, at 4–13. Restricted stock is stock that 
is granted to an employee provisionally. The stock is forfeited if it fails to vest because em-
ployment is terminated before the vesting date, or, in some cases, because performance 
requirements for vesting are not satisfied. See id. at 5. Stock options provide the right but 
no obligation to purchase company shares at a predetermined exercise price between a 
vesting date and an expiration date. Id. Performance shares are similar economically to 
restricted stock, but employees receive performance shares after vesting conditions are 
met, rather than before. See id. at 5–6. SARs are contractual rights that are economically 
equivalent to options. See id. at 9. LTIPs are typically accounting-based incentive plans with 
payoffs determined by firm performance over a several year period. See id. at 5–13, 18–19. 
63 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 23–43 (Mar. 10, 2008) 
(twenty-one pages); Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 21–52 (Mar. 
12, 2008) (thirty-two pages). 
64 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,170 (Sept. 8, 2006) (modifying the summary compensa-
tion table to require disclosure of “total” compensation figures); see also Executive Com-
pensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-8655, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-53185; Investment Company Act Release No. 27218, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 
6548 (Feb. 8, 2006) (proposing modifications and discussing motivation). 
65 At the peak of the dot-com boom in 2000, stock options accounted for over 60% of the 
total compensation of senior S&P 500 executives as measured on an ex ante basis. See Execu-
Comp Data (on file with author). The author’s calculation is based on data compiled from 
S&P’s ExecuComp database, available by subscription at http://mi.compustat.com/. See gener-
ally Walker, supra note 43 (describing the data collection methodology). 
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their prevalence was in part the result of favorable accounting treat-
ment that was eliminated in 2004.66 Today the regulatory playing field 
for stock, options, and non-equity incentives is much more level,67 and 
the use of these instruments is more balanced and diverse. In 2007, for 
example, stock options and SARs accounted for only about 33% of the 
total long-term incentive compensation of the senior executives of S&P 
500 companies.68 Restricted stock and performance units accounted 
for about 44%, and non-equity, accounting-based plans accounted for 
the remaining 23%.69 These figures exclude annual incentives, which 
are also generally based on accounting performance.70 They also gloss 
over significant variations within the categories. Conventional time-
vested restricted stock and stock options probably accounted for only 
about 50% of total long-term incentive compensation for senior S&P 
500 executives for 2007.71
 The current diversity in compensation instruments may be greater 
than is optimal from a shareholder or social perspective,72 but empiri-
cal evidence suggests that diversity increases the efficiency of compen-
sation. For example, there is evidence that the mix of stock and options 
granted to executives varies predictably with firm characteristics such as 
size and growth opportunities.73
                                                                                                                      
 
66 See SFAS 123R, supra note 38. 
67 See David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 
62 Tax L. Rev. 399, 402–08 (2009) (discussing the tax, accounting, and disclosure treat-
ment of various equity compensation instruments). 
68 ExecuComp Data, supra note 65. 
69 Id. 
70 Annual incentives accounted for about 6% of total 2007 compensation for senior 
S&P 500 executives. Id. 
71 Author’s estimate based on ExecuComp data and a sample of hand-collected proxy 
statements allowing for subdivision of options into conventional options and SARs, and 
stock into conventional restricted stock, performance-vested restricted stock, and per-
formance shares. See id. 
72 The question of why these arrangements have become so complex and diverse is in-
teresting, although largely beyond the scope of this Article. The optimistic story would be 
that diversity in company and executive circumstances has led to the diversity in optimal 
pay arrangements. The author has presented a more pessimistic view elsewhere, namely 
that the complexity and diversity serve to obfuscate pay and reduce investor backlash. 
David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 587, 632–40 (2005); accord 
Bebchuk et al., supra note 36, at 786–91 (proposing a managerial power theory of the ex-
ecutive pay setting process in which obfuscation reduces investor outrage that restrains 
pay). Although the pessimistic view suggests that shareholders might benefit from simpli-
fied executive pay packages, it does not imply that the menu of compensation choices 
should be limited legislatively. 
73 See John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incen-
tive Levels, 28 J. Acct. & Econ. 151 (1999); Wayne R. Guay, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to 
Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants, 53 J. Fin. Econ. 43 (1999). Of 
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 Regulatory approaches that would restrict the form of compensa-
tion in a quest to combat short-termism threaten to reduce this diversity 
and potentially the efficiency of pay arrangements.74 The idea of re-
stricting incentive pay to a particular instrument or instruments is even 
more problematic when combined with the idea of requiring executives 
to hold the instrument for an extended period. We have little experi-
ence with very long-term executive incentive pay arrangements and 
really no idea which instruments would best link pay and performance 
over longer periods. Less than 5% of firms utilize stock or options that 
vest more than five years in the future,75 and, interestingly, although a 
few firms utilize incentives that remain in place until retirement, some 
of those plans are based on accounting results rather than stock 
prices.76
D. Short-Termism Is a Function of More Than Annual Compensation 
 Annual executive pay packages seem to be a natural starting point 
for attempting to combat short-termism, and many proposals adopt this 
perspective, but the executive incentive picture is much more complex 
than annual pay arrangements alone would suggest. First, the incen-
tives associated with an executive’s most recent pay package make up 
only a small part of the executive’s total compensation-related incen-
tives.77 In order to properly analyze (or influence) executive incentives, 
one must look at the “stock” of incentives accumulated over time in the 
form of shares, unexercised options, and other long-term arrange-
                                                                                                                      
course, we cannot know the incremental value of the diversity in executive compensation 
composition. The value could be relatively small, but the economic stakes are large. 
74 Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that shareholder “say on pay” mandates could result 
in much less diversity in executive pay arrangements as a result of the likely role played by 
proxy advisory firms and the incentives at those firms. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 350–53. 
He raises similar concerns regarding the potential loss of efficiency from more one-size-
fits-all pay arrangements. See id. at 329–35, 361–63. In Gordon’s view, efficient executive 
pay arrangements should be expected to be diverse because executive pay serves several 
different functions, the importance of which vary from firm to firm and from time to time 
for particular firms. See id. 
75 See Frederick W. Cook & Co., supra note 49, at 17 (reporting that stock options vest 
beyond five years at only 2% of surveyed firms and that restricted stock grants vest beyond 
five years at only 4% of firms). 
76 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 29–30 (Mar. 12, 
2008) (describing “Certificate of Extra Compensation Plan” under which executives re-
ceive units that are valued based on the company’s net asset value and earnings power per 
share and which are payable on retirement). 
77 See Frederick W. Cook & Co., supra note 49, at 4–13. 
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ments, not just the annual “flow” of incentives.78 Second, the economic 
incentives of founders and some other executives may be dominated by 
equity holdings that were not accumulated through compensation at 
all. Third, compensation is not the sole source of incentives. For exam-
ple, the prospect of advancement or the threat of dismissal creates in-
centives that are related to compensation but vary considerably de-
pending on an executive’s age and career arc.79
 All of these incentives, and others, would affect the propensity of 
managers to engage in short-term, reckless behavior. It is obviously very 
difficult for firms to manage these complex webs of incentives and even 
more difficult for a regulator to do so. Regulation focused solely on 
current year compensation is even less likely to hit the mark. 
E. Previous Attempts to Regulate Executive Pay Have Resulted in 
Circumvention and Unintended Consequences 
 Previous attempts to regulate executive pay at the federal level 
have consisted largely of tax incentives and SEC-mandated pay disclo-
sure.80 These initiatives have achieved mixed success at best, and often 
have resulted in circumvention or unintended consequences. These 
experiences provide lessons for those wishing to regulate the form or 
term of executive pay. 
1. Tax Incentives 
 In the last twenty-five years, Congress has twice turned to the tax 
code in an attempt to influence executive pay practices. We have al-
ready encountered IRC § 162(m), which was enacted in 1993 and limits 
a corporation’s tax deduction for non-performance-based pay granted 
to certain senior executives to $1 million per year.81 There is some un-
certainty as to the goals Congress had in mind in enacting this provi-
                                                                                                                      
78 See Core et al., supra note 53, at 30–31 (arguing that it is more appropriate to look at 
the stock than the annual flow in evaluating the level of incentives). 
79 See, e.g., Atreya Chakraborty et al., Termination Risk and Managerial Risk Taking, 13 J. 
Corp. Fin. 170, 171 (2007) (arguing that managerial investment decisions “depend not 
only on how a manager’s compensation changes with firm risk but also on how his/her job 
is affected if the project fails”); Greg Hallman et al., Carrots and Sticks: Incentive Compen-
sation and the Likelihood of Termination 1 (Oct. 13, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122548) (arguing that termination provides a pow-
erful incentive for executives apart from their compensation and may partially offset the 
need to provide incentives through other channels). 
80 See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
81 I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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sion, but if it was meant to slow the increase in total executive pay, it was 
almost certainly unsuccessful.82 If the provision was meant only to re-
direct pay from straight salary to more performance-sensitive channels, 
it was successful, but may have inadvertently sparked the executive 
stock option boom of the 1990s.83
 There is both good news and bad news here for proponents of 
regulation improving the link between executive pay and long-term 
performance. On the positive side, the § 162(m) experience suggests 
that it may be easier to influence the design of compensation than the 
amount. On the negative side, the experience highlights how difficult it 
is to balance executive incentives. Section 162(m) may have been too 
successful in increasing the performance sensitivity of executive pay. 
 No more effective, apparently, was Congress’s 1984 attempt to rein 
in excessive “golden parachute” executive severance packages by re-
stricting corporate tax deductions for parachute payments and impos-
ing excise taxes on recipients of excess payments.84 Although the rule 
initially led to some firms capping parachute payments at the maxi-
mum amount deductible, over time companies began to exceed the 
cap, forfeit the deduction on the excess, and “gross up” executives with 
an additional payment to compensate them for the excise tax, effec-
tively shifting the entire cost of non-compliance to the shareholders.85
                                                                                                                      
82 See Robert F. Göx, Tax Incentives for Inefficient Executive Pay and Reward for Luck 2 
(Mar. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=823884) 
(reporting that the “average total pay of S&P 500 CEOs rose from $2.6 million in 1993 to $14 
million in 2000” and remained at $9.4 million in 2002 even after the burst of the dot-com 
stock market bubble); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the 
Tax Code, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 877, 917–20 (2007) (describing empirical evidence indicat-
ing that § 162(m) was associated with an increase in executive pay). 
83 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in 14 
Tax Policy and the Economy 1, 36 ( James M. Poterba ed., 2000) (finding that post-1993 
salary reductions were more than offset by additional stock option grants); see also Polsky, 
supra note 82, at 906 & n.125 (documenting the widespread belief among informed ob-
servers that § 162(m) contributed to the options explosion, but also noting the lack of 
clear cut empirical evidence). 
84 See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (denying deduction and imposing excise tax on severance 
payments in excess of an executive’s average compensation over the previous five years). 
85 See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 
125, 136, 139–40 (2001). Because a gross-up payment is subject to income tax and addi-
tional excise taxes and is not deductible for the corporation, the decision to gross up an 
executive can result in a cost to shareholders that is an order of magnitude greater than 
the benefit to the executive. See David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option 
Accounting Gap, 96 Tax Notes 851, 855 (2002). Nonetheless, a 1996 study reported that 
over half of CEO contracts included a golden parachute gross up provision. See Carol Bo-
wie & Judy Fischer, Have Parachutes Become More Than Security Blankets?, Mergers & Acqui-
sitions, Nov.–Dec. 1996, at 17, 19. 
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 One lesson to be learned from this experience is that the effec-
tiveness of tax rules (or other non-compulsory regulation) aimed at 
executive pay may be limited because of the significant agency prob-
lems in the pay process. Given this track record, one can readily under-
stand why a more coercive regulatory attack on short-termism might be 
appealing, but, of course, the potential inefficiencies and costs of com-
pulsory regulation would be even greater. 
2. SEC Executive Pay Disclosure Requirements 
 The SEC’s proxy disclosure rules might be viewed as another at-
tempt to regulate executive pay. Over the last eighteen years, the SEC 
has steadily increased the coverage, depth, and specificity of required 
disclosures.86 Currently, firms are required to provide detailed discus-
sion and analysis of executive pay as well as numerous tables, the con-
tent of which is specified in exacting detail, including a summary com-
pensation table that contains a bottom line total compensation figure 
for each of five senior executives.87
 These disclosure requirements were not directly aimed at limiting 
executive pay, but it is safe to say that many commentators hoped that 
shedding light on pay practices would result in greater restraint. There 
is no empirical evidence to date, however, that the proxy disclosure 
rules have reduced or slowed the increase in executive pay and good 
reason to suspect the reverse.88 One of the suspected responses to sys-
                                                                                                                      
86 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,160 (Sept. 8, 2006) (reviewing history of executive pay 
disclosure regulation and noting that regulations issued in 1992 replaced narrative discus-
sion with tabular disclosure). The 1992 regulations actually marked a return to tabular 
presentation that was first mandated in the 1930s and that was replaced by narrative dis-
closure in the 1980s. See id. at 53,161. 
87 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2009). 
88 See, e.g., John M. Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and 
Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. Fin. Econ. 152, 166 (2008). In a study of the effects of 
benchmarking CEO pay, Professors John Bizjak, Michael Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen 
found that “CEOs with pay below the median of their peers receive substantially larger 
raises” than CEOs paid above the median. Id. The authors conclude that their results are 
consistent with an efficient system for determining the reservation wage, but they note that 
“benchmarking . . . could have led to greater increases in pay than would have occurred in 
its absence.” See id. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein document a growth in 
executive pay between 1993 and 2003 in excess of that which can be explained by changes 
in firm performance. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 
Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 283, 284–89 (2005). 
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tematic executive pay disclosure was a kind of “Lake Wobegon” effect.89 
Company boards generally believed that their executives were above 
average, or believed that admitting that their executives were below av-
erage would undermine investor confidence.90 In both cases, fuller dis-
closure of pay appeared to lead more often to pay increases than de-
creases, as low-pay firms sought to bring pay levels up at least to the 
average of the relevant peer group.91
 Another likely response to enhanced scrutiny under the 1992 dis-
closure regulations was a shift in compensation from quite visible chan-
nels of pay, such as salary, stock, and options, to less visible channels, 
such as pensions.92 The 1992 disclosure regime was not comprehensive, 
however; it practically invited creative circumvention.93 Such subter-
fuge is rendered less effective by the SEC’s 2006 mandate that firms 
disclose a bottom line figure including all channels of pay,94 but it is 
probably too early to determine whether the revised rules have had any 
salutary effect on the overall amount of executive compensation. 
 There are at least two lessons to be learned from the SEC’s experi-
ence with mandatory executive pay disclosure. First, to the extent that 
disclosure regimes are not comprehensive, one should expect execu-
tives to creatively mitigate the impact of these rules by various circum-
ventions, such as shifting pay channels. Second, one should be aware 
that even disclosure regimes can produce unintended consequences, 
                                                                                                                      
89 See Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. Fin. 
Econ. 280, 280 (2009). Lake Wobegon, of course, is radio personality Garrison Keillor’s 
mythical Minnesota community where “all the children are above average.” See id.; see also A 
Prairie Home Companion with Garrison Keillor Home Page, http://prairiehome.publicra- 
dio.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
90 See, e.g., Roundtable, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan. 
2003, at 68, 72 (relating comments of former DuPont CEO Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. that the 
“main reason compensation increases every year is that most boards want their CEO to be 
in the top half of the CEO peer group” in order to make “the company look strong”). 
91 See Bizjak et al., supra note 88, at 154 (reporting that seventy-three of one hundred 
randomly selected companies “mention targeting at least one component of pay at or above 
the peer group median or mean”). See generally Hayes & Schaefer, supra note 89 (developing a 
game-theoretic model of the Lake Wobegon effect and demonstrating that the effect can 
lead to an upward distortion in equilibrium CEO pay under certain conditions). 
92 See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance 95–111 (2004) 
(describing postretirement payments and benefits used to compensate managers). 
93 See id. at 106 (noting the SEC’s reporting requirements ended when executives re-
tired, allowing firms to provide substantial post-retirement benefits that would never ap-
pear in publicly filed compensation tables). 
94 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,170 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
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such as the upward ratcheting in pay following the imposition of the 
initial disclosure rules. 
III. Pitfalls of Existing Programs and Proposals for  
Combating Short-Termism 
 The generic challenges inherent in crafting a regulatory response 
to short-termism are exemplified by several specific programs and pro-
posals that have been offered by legislators, administrators, and com-
mentators. Moreover, these specific approaches highlight additional 
concerns that may arise in attempting to craft a regulatory response. 
Consider the following five plans, proposals, or suggestions: 
• In early February 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department announced 
that all incentive compensation received by top executives at firms 
receiving “exceptional assistance” from the government would have 
to be in the form of restricted stock that could not vest before the 
government loans were fully repaid.95 Congress modified the 
Treasury plan in the economic stimulus bill that it passed in mid-
February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(“ARRA”), broadening the reach to include at least one executive 
of each participant in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), 
but retaining the requirement that executive bonuses be paid in re-
stricted stock that may not vest until the loans are repaid.96 Unlike 
the Treasury plan that would have capped non-incentive pay at 
$500,000 per year, however, ARRA caps restricted stock incentive 
pay at one-third of total annual compensation.97 
• Professors Roberta Romano and Sanjai Bhagat have recently rec-
ommended that 85–90% of executive incentive pay take the form 
of restricted stock or restricted stock options that cannot be sold or 
exercised during employment or for two to four years following 
termination.98 They would have the Treasury Department man-
                                                                                                                      
95 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on 
Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
tg15.htm. 
96 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 
Stat. 115, 516–18. The final act contains some vague language that will be open to inter-
pretation by the Treasury Department when it writes implementing regulations. See Deb-
orah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 
2009, at A1. 
97See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i)(II) (West 2001, Supp. 2009 & Supp. I 2009); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 95. 
98 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 361, 368–69. 
456 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:435 
date such a rule for firms receiving bailout funds, and they suggest 
that an argument can be made to extend the rule to include man-
agers of all FDIC-insured financial institutions, but otherwise they 
would leave the decision to individual boards of directors.99 
• Jesse Brill, a practitioner and frequent commentator on executive 
pay, has proposed that executives be barred from cashing in stock 
until they reach age sixty-five or are two years past retirement.100 
• The Aspen Institute’s Judith Samuelson and Professor Lynn Stout 
have suggested that executives be required to hold “a significant 
portion of their equity for a period beyond their tenure.”101 It is 
not clear, however, whether they favor regulation to this effect or 
simply wish to encourage boards to place this restriction on execu-
tive pay.102 
• Judge Richard Posner has recently advocated that firms be re-
quired to deliver a minimum percentage of CEO pay in the form 
of restricted stock that could not be sold for some specified num-
ber of years.103 
 Most of these approaches envision compulsory regulation, and, 
unless the underlying causes of short-termism are identified and cor-
rected, some sort of coercive regulation presumably would be needed 
to cause boards to alter their pay practices to deter reckless behavior 
and earnings manipulation. As discussed in Part I, the short-termism 
problem, to the extent that it is a real problem, could reflect share-
holder preferences resulting from market myopia or externalities, 
could result from managerial agency problems, or could follow from a 
current regulatory bias in favor of options.104 This Part considers these 
programs and proposals as models for generally applicable, coercive 
regulation of executive pay, and explores the costs and risks that follow. 
A. Diversification, Liquidity, and Valuation Problems Arising from  
Minimum Holding Periods 
 Each of these approaches places a minimum term on some or all 
incentive pay—presumably a term that exceeds current vesting prac-
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. at 367. 
100 See Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, Wall St. 
J., Feb. 6, 2009, at C1 (quoting Brill). 
101 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1. 
102 See id. 
103 See Posner, supra note 5, at 1045–46. 
104 See supra notes 19–44 and accompanying text. 
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tices. Longer holding periods for incentive pay raise liquidity, diversifi-
cation, and valuation concerns for participants. Unless one is prepared 
to adopt the extreme position of placing a hard cap on the total com-
pensation received by executives, one must recognize that the associ-
ated costs would largely be borne by shareholders.105 In short, there is a 
tradeoff between the term of executive pay and the amount of pay. 
 Bhagat and Romano anticipate some of these concerns. They rec-
ognize that forcing executives to hold stock and options until retire-
ment would leave them under-diversified and facing a lack of liquid-
ity.106 Their response to the diversification concern is to suggest that 
the amount of equity pay would be increased to offset the greater 
risk.107 In other words, the shareholders would compensate the execu-
tives for limiting their diversification. But there are two potential prob-
lems with this solution. First, if the compensation term had been effi-
ciently set by the market, this combination—more pay and riskier pay—
would represent an inefficient deviation for shareholders from the op-
timal contract. Second, whether the initial contract was optimally set or 
not, increasing the amount of equity pay to offset heightened risk could 
expose firms and executives to greater outrage over the size of execu-
tive pay packages.108 As a result, it might be difficult for firms to make 
their executives whole on a risk-adjusted basis.109
 To alleviate the liquidity concern, Bhagat and Romano suggest that 
firms increase salaries and that Congress facilitate this practice by in-
creasing the deductibility of executive salaries for corporate tax pur-
poses.110 This fix suffers from the same defects as increasing equity pay 
                                                                                                                      
105 Under an optimal contracting view of the pay setting process, executive compensa-
tion would be held constant on a risk and liquidity adjusted basis, and shareholders would 
bear virtually all of the cost of restrictions placed on vesting. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 
36, at 761–83 (setting forth the optimal contracting view of executive compensation and 
detailing possible limitations). Under a managerial power view, executives might absorb a 
fraction of these costs since increased nominal pay, even in compensation for these bur-
dens, could trigger investor outrage. See id. at 786–91. 
106 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 367–69. 
107 See id. at 367–68. 
108 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 36, at 786. 
109 Shareholder outrage is a consideration if one believes that executive pay practices 
are not entirely the result of arm’s length contracting between the board and the execu-
tives. See id. at 786–91. Executives might be able to deflect investor outrage over larger pay 
packages by pointing out that the changes were imposed upon them by government regu-
lators. Cf. Polsky, supra note 82, at 905–06 (arguing that, under a managerial power model, 
I.R.C. § 162(m) would have provided managers with an excuse to rewrite compensation 
contracts in their favor). 
110 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 368–69. Bhagat and Romano also suggest 
that a small fraction of incentive pay (10–15%) be immediately available to executives. Id. 
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to compensate for restricting diversification and the additional risk that 
using salary to compensate for reduced incentive pay liquidity may actu-
ally undermine the link between pay and long-term performance.111
 Of course, even if they are compensated, executives would be 
tempted to hedge stock and option grants they are required to hold 
until retirement as a self-help means of improving liquidity and diversi-
fication.112 Dean David Schizer has shown that tax and securities laws 
make it difficult and costly for executives to hedge their exposure to 
options, but that executives can readily hedge restricted stock in the 
period between grant and vesting.113 If the motivation is strong 
enough, however, executives will hedge option grants as well. Thus, 
steps would need to be taken to ensure that compulsory holding peri-
ods are not undermined by increased hedging. 
 Lengthening equity compensation holding periods would also 
amplify valuation problems. As several commentators have suggested, 
restricted stock issued by the problem banks accepting federal bailout 
funds resembles a stock option, because it is subordinate to the claims 
of the government and bondholders, and would pay off for the execu-
tives only if conditions improve significantly.114 Consequently, execu-
tives who are forced to accept such stock and to hold it until govern-
ment loans are repaid or until their employment is terminated will 
reasonably value the stock like an option, i.e., as worth considerably less 
than the market price of the stock. Bhagat and Romano suggest that 
executives be given more stock to offset the value differential,115 but 
under current pay disclosure rules, the market price of this stock, not 
the lower option value, would be reported as the measure of executive 
compensation.116 As a result, executives in this situation would receive 
more of something they value less, and the gap between the value of 
pay perceived by the executives and the value perceived by the public 
would expand even more. 
                                                                                                                      
111 At the extreme, firms that entirely replace incentive pay with straight salary would 
create no direct link between pay and long-term performance. 
112 Compensation would not reduce the incentive to hedge. 
113 See Schizer, supra note 35, at 493. 
114 See Lucian Bebchuk, Op-Ed., Congress Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, Wall St. J., Feb. 
17, 2009, at A15 (noting that the value of these banks’ common shares “might largely rep-
resent an ‘out-of-the-money option,’ expected to deliver value only if things considerably 
improve”); Victor Fleischer, Two Quick Workarounds on Executive Pay Caps, Conglomerate 
Blog, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/02/two-quick-workarounds-
on-executive-pay-caps.html (observing that if restricted stock only vests after the govern-
ment is paid back, the effect on executive behavior is more like that of a stock option). 
115 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 367. 
116 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2009). 
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 To be sure, this valuation problem would be most acute at trou-
bled banks participating in the federal bailout programs, which are not 
the primary concern of this Article, but the valuation gap is not unique 
to troubled banks or to restricted stock. Bhagat and Romano have also 
proposed that executive stock options not be exercisable until two to 
four years following retirement.117 For the average CEO, they suggest, 
this would mean waiting for seven to nine years to exercise options.118 
Today, options typically become exercisable three to five years following 
grant and are exercised soon thereafter if in the money.119 Given the 
liquidity and diversification constraints discussed above, imposing 
longer holding periods would significantly reduce the value of options 
to executives. Perversely, however, the calculated value of an option 
that is assumed to be exercised in eight years would be greater than that 
of an option that is expected to be exercised in five to six years.120 At 
the very least, the current approach to compensatory option valuation 
and disclosure would need to be rethought if longer holding periods 
were imposed. 
 Of course, if executive pay is systemically too short-term focused 
today, some of the diversification, liquidity, and valuation costs de-
scribed above are worth incurring. To the extent that agency problems 
result in sub-optimally short-term compensation, shareholders might 
benefit from regulation that increases the term of pay, even if they are 
forced to pay for it. Moreover, to the extent that excessively short-term 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 363. 
118 See id. The authors do not consider the average holding period of junior executives 
under their proposal, but it would certainly be longer than their estimate of the average 
CEO holding period. 
119 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
Acct. & Econ. 3, 35 (2002). 
120 Executive options are valued for disclosure purposes using an option pricing mod-
el. See SFAS 123R, supra note 38, at 40–52 (describing option valuation methodology that is 
used for SEC disclosure as well as financial accounting purposes). Generally, the expira-
tion date of an option is one of the inputs to these models, and the value of an option 
increases with its term. See id. at 42–43. In order to adjust for predictable early exercise, 
however, the expected holding period of compensatory options (often five to six years) is 
substituted in these models for the contractual time to expiration when calculating value 
for disclosure and accounting purposes. See id. at 45–47. Presumably, however, if an option 
cannot be exercised before retirement and the expected time to retirement is eight years, 
that period would be used for valuation purposes resulting in greater disclosed value. Cer-
tainly, there would be no basis for choosing a shorter, counterfactual period. The root of 
the problem is that the current option valuation approach utilizes a rough adjustment to 
the models for the unique facts of compensatory options. The adequacy of this approach, 
however, depends on an assumption that the current, relatively short vesting periods for 
options do not significantly impact exercise behavior. This assumption would not be valid 
for executives barred from exercising options for seven to nine years. 
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focused pay results in negative externalities, shareholders should bear 
the costs of regulation that mitigates those externalities. The problem, 
as discussed in the next section, is that mandatory, one-size-fits-all vest-
ing periods would be arbitrary and extremely blunt instruments.121
B. The Problem of One-Size-Fits-All Regulation 
 Part I suggests that the link between executive pay and long-term 
performance may be inadequate, systemically.122 But, even if one ac-
cepts this premise, no economic theory or empirical analysis can tell us 
how inadequate the link is for a particular firm, industry, or even for 
U.S. firms on average. Despite this fact, each approach described above 
involves a one-size-fits-all holding period for equity compensation. Bha-
gat and Romano, for example, suggest a holding period of retirement 
plus two to four years, which would represent at least a doubling of the 
average vesting period of CEO equity compensation and an even greater 
increase in the average vesting period of equity granted to subordinate 
executives.123
 Perhaps a dramatic shift in executive pay term along these lines is 
required to overcome agency problems and force companies to inter-
nalize all of the costs of short-termism. Any arbitrary holding period or 
periods for incentive pay raises the possibility, however, that the term 
will be excessive and inefficient for some, perhaps many, firms and their 
executives. 
 From the shareholders’ perspective, the optimal term of executive 
pay would balance the costs related to diversification, liquidity, and 
valuation against the benefits of tying executive wealth to long-term per-
formance.124 The optimal term would vary considerably by industry, 
firm, and executive. Consider, for example, requiring executives to hold 
equity incentives until retirement. Although the benefit of doing so at 
similarly situated firms might be fairly constant, the cost would be much 
greater for a forty-year-old CEO than for a sixty-year-old CEO. Moreover, 
although the cost of this rule might be similar for two fifty-year-old 
CEOs, the benefit for a regulated utility company with low growth op-
portunities, little scope for earnings manipulation, etc., might be much 
less than it would be for a company like AIG. The bottom line is that 
                                                                                                                      
121 See infra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 19–44 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text. 
124 See Hall & Murphy, supra note 119, at 6 (noting that “the tradeoff between risk and 
incentives lies at the heart of agency theory”). 
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one-size-fits-all targets for executive pay term that have real bite will in-
evitably exceed the optimal mark for some firms and executives. 
C. Limiting Compensation Diversity 
 We now turn our attention from regulation of the term of incentive 
pay to regulation of its form. Each of the approaches discussed would, to 
some extent, limit incentive pay to a specific instrument or instru-
ments. This is troubling for several reasons. First, as this section de-
scribes, instrument-specific regulation limits the diversity of devices that 
firms can use in linking pay to long-term performance and potentially 
reduces the efficiency of compensation arrangements.125
 Consider, for example, Bhagat and Romano’s proposal to limit 
incentive pay to restricted stock and restricted stock options.126 Obvi-
ously the details would need to be spelled out, but if the idea behind 
the proposal is to limit incentives to conventional time-vested restricted 
stock and options, about half of current long-term incentive pay (as 
well as 100% of annual incentives) would be off the table.127
 Of course, the acceptable circle of incentive pay could be drawn 
more widely to include similar long-term incentive arrangements such 
as SARs (phantom stock options), performance-vested restricted stock, 
and performance shares (essentially phantom performance-vested re-
stricted stock).128 Performance vesting is generally based on accounting 
results,129 which might raise concerns regarding manipulation, but, as 
discussed below, manipulation is less of a concern with respect to long-
term incentives than annual bonuses.130 Moreover, companies have le-
gitimate reasons for avoiding or delaying issuing actual shares through 
their executive incentive programs. For example, some phantom equity 
plans may reflect investor concerns regarding excessive shareholder 
dilution from traditional stock and option plans. 
                                                                                                                      
125 See infra notes 126–138 and accompanying text. 
126 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 361. 
127 Obviously, an approach that would limit firms to restricted stock only would be 
even more restrictive. 
128 See Frederick W. Cook & Co., supra note 49, at 4–13. The Obama administration’s 
February 2009 plan hinted at this possibility. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
supra note 95 (limiting senior executive incentives at firms receiving exceptional assistance 
to “restricted stock or other similar long-term incentive arrangements”). 
129 Although performance measures vary widely, profit measures, such as earnings per 
share, net income, or operating income, are frequently employed. See Frederick W. Cook 
& Co., supra note 49, at 18. 
130 See infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
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 Even if “stock” and “options” are defined broadly to include per-
formance-vested instruments and non-equity economic equivalents, 
however, a compulsory approach along these lines would bar firms 
from utilizing pure accounting-based incentive plans. As noted above, 
long-term accounting-based plans currently account for almost a quar-
ter of long-term senior executive incentives, and annual accounting-
based bonuses account for about 6% of total senior executive pay.131
 Of course, accounting-based incentives have been the target of a 
great deal of academic criticism.132 Annual accounting-based bonuses 
tend to increase managerial myopia and are subject to manipulation. 
Well documented, for example, is the “big bath” phenomenon, which 
entails managers taking operational steps to defer income and acceler-
ate expenses when it becomes clear that annual targets will not be 
achieved,133 thus improving the prospects for big bonuses the following 
year. 
 Opportunities for manipulation and payoffs decline as the meas-
urement period increases, however. Accounting-based LTIPs that 
measure performance over three or more years should present much 
less of a manipulation problem than annual bonuses.134 Indeed, such 
plans might actually represent a stronger commitment to long-term 
focus than equity grants as they insulate participants from the influence 
of short-term stock price fluctuations. It is, therefore, not clear that 
firms should be precluded from utilizing these plans.135
 Moreover, despite their drawbacks, precluding all annual incen-
tives for executives would appear to be an overreaction to a general 
concern about inadequate focus on long-term performance, particu-
larly with respect to executives junior to the CEO. Eliminating long-
term accounting based incentives would certainly be problematic for 
this group. Although 100% equity incentive compensation might be 
appropriate for a CEO, who ultimately is accountable for the firm’s 
share price, it would not be appropriate for a subordinate executive, 
who is directly responsible for some facet of operations and has much 
                                                                                                                      
131 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
132 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 713, 739 (1995) (arguing that accounting-based bonuses encourage executives to 
manipulate short-term earnings). 
133 See Steven Balsam, An Introduction to Executive Compensation 315 (2002) 
(describing the big bath). 
134 See Frederick W. Cook & Co., supra note 49, at 5–13 (detailing the prevalence of 
long-term accounting-based incentive plans). 
135 See Samuelson & Stout, supra note 1 (suggesting that “we need new ways to measure 
long-run corporate performance, rather than simply relying on stock price”). 
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less influence over the share price.136 Finally, as discussed above, limit-
ing incentive pay arrangements to stock and options or any other par-
ticular instruments is even more troubling when contemplated against 
the backdrop of lengthy new holding period requirements, given our 
relatively paltry experience with incentive arrangements extending be-
yond five years.137
 To be sure, requiring that incentives take the form of stock and 
options would not necessarily preclude firms from using other per-
formance measures to determine the amount of equity compensation 
to be conferred on an executive or, perhaps, from maintaining ac-
counting-based plans that simply pay out, after the requisite holding 
period, using vested stock as currency.138 The existing proposals, how-
ever, appear to contemplate that executives would hold equity and be 
exposed to the firm’s share price for an extended period. In many cases 
another means of linking executive wealth to long-term firm perform-
ance might be more efficient. 
D. Excessive Conservatism 
 The compensation reform proposals also create a risk of a shift 
towards excessive conservatism. Although backlash against stock option 
compensation is understandable in the wake of various corporate scan-
dals involving options, regulation along the lines of the ARRA bailout 
legislation or the approach endorsed by Judge Posner that would limit 
incentive pay to restricted stock might encourage excessively conserva-
tive executive behavior.139 Moreover, when combined with lengthy 
holding periods, even approaches that allow firms to issue options or 
stock might lead to excessive conservatism. Policy makers should be 
wary of adopting regulations that discourage long-term value creation 
in a quest to mitigate short-termism. 
 As has already been shown, the appetite for risk created by a com-
pensation basket consisting solely of cash, perks, and restricted stock is 
generally less than the appetite of an ordinary diversified share-
                                                                                                                      
136 This concern obviously grows in importance with the size of the executive pool sub-
ject to the regulation. For example, the restricted stock limitation under ARRA applies to 
more than twenty executives at some companies. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(ii)(IV) 
(West 2001, Supp. 2009 & Supp. I 2009). 
137 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
138 For example, Bhagat and Romano state only that executive “incentive compensa-
tion plans should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options.” See Bhagat & Ro-
mano, supra note 5, at 363. 
139 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221; Posner, supra note 5, at 1045–46. 
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holder.140 In order to overcome executive risk aversion and more accu-
rately align long-term incentives, options are typically added to the 
compensation mix.141 Of course, executive incentives are not solely the 
product of current compensation.142 For example, even with a relatively 
conservative pay package, some executives would be encouraged to 
take risks in order to gain recognition and promotion.143 Even CEOs, 
who are unlikely to be auditioning for better jobs, might take some 
risks to increase the prospects of retaining their jobs. On balance, how-
ever, pay packages lacking options could lead to undue conservatism 
on the part of senior corporate executives. 
 Although Bhagat and Romano are not explicit on this point, it is 
likely that their proposal to limit incentive compensation to restricted 
stock or options reflects the value of options in aligning long-term in-
centives.144 This approach may represent an improvement over stock-
only proposals, but even this proposal might result in excessive conser-
vatism. 
 As discussed above, imposing lengthy holding periods on incentive 
pay reduces executive liquidity, impairs diversification, and increases the 
wedge between the cost of equity compensation to firms and the value 
to executives.145 The latter two effects are more pronounced for options 
than they are for stock. The exposure to share price created by a $1 mil-
lion option grant may be several times greater than the exposure cre-
ated by a $1 million stock grant.146 Moreover, the discount to market 
value assessed by non-diversified executives is greater for risky options 
                                                                                                                      
140 See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text. This statement is qualified because in 
the context of the bailout legislation, restricted stock might take on the incentive proper-
ties of an option and might promote risk taking. See Bebchuk, supra note 114; Fleischer, 
supra note 114. If the banks were liquidated as is, shareholders would get little or nothing, 
but if the bailout plan were a success, shareholders would participate. See Bebchuk, supra 
note 114, at A15; Fleischer, supra note 114. In this particular situation, the government 
would have better protected taxpayers by forcing the executives to take a creditor interest 
in the banks, rather than an equity interest. For solidly solvent firms, however, executive 
stock holdings promote conservatism. 
141 See Core et al., supra note 53, at 33. 
142 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
144 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 361. 
145 See supra notes 105–121 and accompanying text. 
146 For example, at the grant date, options issued by Johnson & Johnson to its senior 
executives in 2007 created an exposure to share price four times greater than the exposure 
created by an equivalent value of restricted stock. See Johnson & Johnson, Proxy Statement 
(Form DEF 14A), at 44 (Mar. 12, 2008) (author’s calculation based on data disclosed in 
proxy statement). 
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than stock and increases with the required holding period.147 As a re-
sult, one should expect that requiring executives to hold equity com-
pensation until retirement would shift their preferences in the direction 
of stock, that negotiated compensation packages would include more 
stock, and that all else being equal, executives would act more conserva-
tively. In the current economic environment, of course, the prospect of 
executives acting more conservatively sounds attractive. The concern is 
that the balance could shift too far in the direction of conservatism, 
placing a brake on the long-term performance of U.S. companies. 
E. Risk of Circumvention 
 Most of the proposals that have been discussed aim to deter short-
termism by specifying the form and/or term of executive incentive pay, 
but not the amount or fraction of such pay.148 To the extent that their 
plan would be compulsory, Bhagat and Romano, for example, would 
require that incentive pay consist of either restricted stock or restricted 
options that may not vest until some period after retirement, but, ap-
parently, they would leave the mix of incentive and non-incentive pay 
up to individual firms.149 As this section demonstrates, however, unless 
a floor is placed on incentive pay or a cap on non-incentive pay, man-
dating lengthy holding periods for incentive pay could lead to circum-
vention that undermines the attempt to link pay with long-term per-
formance.150 Circumvention could be avoided by placing a restriction 
on the amount or fraction of incentive or non-incentive pay, but doing 
so would magnify one-size-fits-all inefficiencies.151
 For example, Bhagat and Romano suggest that firms should in-
crease salaries to provide executives with liquidity to make up for the 
lengthy holding periods for stock and options they propose, and they 
suggest that the IRC § 162(m) limit on the deductibility of non-per-
formance-based pay be increased from $1 million to $2 million, accord-
ingly.152 But unless non-incentive pay is capped, firms might respond to 
long holding periods placed on incentive pay by reducing or even 
eliminating incentive pay and increasing salaries. Thus, an approach of 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Hall & Murphy, supra note 119, at 36 (demonstrating the effect of increased 
vesting periods on the gap between company cost and the value placed on equity pay by 
undiversified executives). 
148 See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
149 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 361. 
150 See infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. 
152 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 368. 
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this sort could undermine the link between pay and long-term per-
formance. 
 Although some readers might believe that the § 162(m) limit on 
the deduction for non-performance-based pay effectively caps non-
incentive pay and would limit circumvention, this is far from clear. To-
day, despite their ability to qualify compensation as performance based 
and achieve deductibility, many firms grant non-deductible compensa-
tion to their senior executives.153 As firms routinely state in their proxy 
materials, deductibility is a factor, but not a prerequisite, in designing 
executive pay packages.154 If vesting limitations along the lines proposed 
by Bhagat and Romano were mandated, one would expect many firms 
to shift from incentive pay to salary despite the lack of deductibility un-
der § 162(m).155 Public companies would not have to abandon incentive 
alignment to do so. Companies could require executives to purchase 
firm equity on the open market as a condition of employment.156
 This Article does not advocate a cap on executive salaries. It simply 
points out that executive pay regulation taking the form of vesting limi-
tations is undermined absent such a cap. The Treasury Department’s 
February 2009 plan would have capped executive salaries at $500,000 
in addition to requiring that incentive pay be in the form of restricted 
stock.157 Again, this plan was limited to bailout firms, but as a model for 
more general regulation it is even more problematic than the Bhagat 
and Romano proposal. First, this type of approach would not eliminate 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deduc-
tions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. Acct. & Pub. 
Pol’y 300, 321–23 (2005) (finding forfeited tax deduction in 40% of firm-year observa-
tions). 
154 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 32 (Mar. 10, 2008) 
(stating that its “policy is to qualify our incentive compensation programs for full corpo-
rate deductibility to the extent feasible and consistent with our overall compensation ob-
jectives”). 
155 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 368. Perversely, a $2 million limit on de-
ductible salary could become more of an expectation than a cap, thereby undermining the 
link between pay and long-term performance even at smaller firms that would not have 
paid salaries this large absent the § 162(m) focal point. See David G. Harris & Jane R. Liv-
ingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of 
Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 Acct. Rev. 997, 1015–16 (2002) (finding that firms that 
paid their CEOs less than $1 million prior to the enactment of IRC § 162(m) increased 
cash compensation in proportion to the gap between existing compensation and the $1 
million deduction limit). 
156 Shares held outside of equity compensation plans may also undermine the link be-
tween executive wealth and long-term firm performance. Unless shareholding guidelines 
are truly binding, these shares expose executives to short-term share price risk. 
157 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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circumvention unless it also capped compensation in the form of perks, 
benefits, retirement contributions, etc. Second, if it did effectively cap 
all non-incentive pay, it would have gone well beyond the goal of link-
ing pay to long-term performance. The regulation would have specified 
the instruments and, in the case of salary, capped the amount of one of 
the instruments. At this point, the plan would have eliminated almost 
all firm discretion and diversity related to executive pay. Given the di-
versity in executive age, tenure, expenses, and other factors, it should 
be obvious that a one-size-fits-all cap on the salary component of pay 
would be highly inefficient.158 It should also be obvious that a sizable 
amount of restricted stock would be needed to compensate executives 
for the salary cap. 
 Another way to prevent circumvention would be to require that 
some fraction of total executive compensation awarded each year con-
sist of incentive pay of certain specified form, as Judge Posner has re-
cently advocated.159 But the arbitrary fraction selected would impose 
another inefficient one-size-fits-all restriction on pay packages, and the 
annual nature of this restriction is also troubling. Equity compensation 
grants are often lumpy; they are not made every year.160 Imagine a firm 
that has just hired a new CEO and made a large equity grant to attract 
the executive and align his or her incentives with shareholders. The 
firm may not need to grant more equity compensation in the following 
year. Instead, its compensation focus might turn to salary or annual in-
centives. Thus, an arbitrary annual specification of the fraction of com-
pensation that must consist of long-term incentives would not only be a 
much poorer fit for some firms than others, it would also be a poorer 
fit for a particular firm in some years than in others. 
IV. Are There Better Ways to Combat Short-Termism? 
 Given the considerable challenges and potential negative conse-
quences inherent in any attempt to regulate coercively the form and 
                                                                                                                      
158 See supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. 
159 See Posner, supra note 5, at 1045–46. ARRA limits restricted stock incentive pay to 
one-third of total compensation. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i)(II) (West 2001, Supp. 
2009 & Supp. I 2009). Placing a cap on incentive pay and imposing lengthy holding peri-
ods is not likely to improve the link between pay and long-term performance. It does, 
however, encourage firms to repay TARP funds as quickly as possible in order to avoid this 
and other ARRA restrictions. See, e.g., Kate Kelly & Robin Sidel, Goldman, Others Getting Aid 
Are Eager to Pay It All Back, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A10 (noting that Goldman Sachs 
and other companies were eager to pay back TARP funds in order to escape toughened 
scrutiny that complicates operations). 
160 See Walker, supra note 43, at 16–17. 
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term of executive compensation, it is not clear that the project should 
be undertaken. To be sure, minor adjustments might be made that 
could prove beneficial. For example, firms might be required to in-
clude effective clawback provisions in executive compensation plans 
that would facilitate the recoupment of bonuses predicated on inaccu-
rate financial results that are later restated.161 Even if the potential 
benefits of further regulation do not outweigh the pitfalls, however, 
Congress may feel compelled to regulate more comprehensively none-
theless. Recognizing this possibility, this Part suggests that the regula-
tory approaches analyzed above may not strike the best balance be-
tween mitigating short-termism and avoiding harmful consequences.162 
This Part, then, offers two ideas that policy makers should consider if 
faced with the job of crafting a regulatory response to short-termism: 
focusing regulation solely on the term of pay and adopting a compre-
hensive disclosure-based response.163
A. Regulation of the Term of Pay But Not the Instruments 
 If the primary concern driving regulation of executive compensa-
tion is discouraging reckless, short-term behavior, including earnings 
manipulation, fraud, and bet-the-company risk taking, policy makers 
should consider regulating the term of pay but leaving the choice of 
pay instruments up to individual companies. Forcing an executive to 
hold stock, options, or unsecured creditor interests for a certain period 
should cause the executive to think twice about risking the solvency of 
the business. And, of course, limiting regulatory intervention to term 
would allow firms the leeway to choose the most efficient long-term 
incentives for their situation. 
 For example, the approach advocated by Judge Posner could be 
modified to require only that some fraction of pay not vest for a speci-
fied number of years, or Bhagat and Romano’s approach could be 
modified to require only that all pay beyond salary (and perhaps a lim-
ited budget for perks) remain unvested until retirement plus two to 
four years.164 The unvested pay could take the form of stock, an option, 
a long-term accounting-based incentive, or, as suggested above, even an 
unsecured creditor interest, such as deferred compensation. 
                                                                                                                      
161 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(3)(B). Unfortunately, clawback provisions would do 
nothing to discourage recklessness, and so they do not represent a complete solution to 
short-termism. 
162 See infra notes 164–175 and accompanying text. 
163 See infra notes 164–175 and accompanying text. 
164 See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 5, at 361; Posner, supra note 5, at 1045–46. 
2010] The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay 469 
 Alternatively, term-only regulation could be based on a compre-
hensive measure of the average holding period of an executive’s pay 
package. Imagine, for example, a rule mandating a minimum four-year 
weighted average holding period for CEO pay. This approach would 
continue to ensure that executives are bound to their firms economi-
cally for an extended period, but would allow firms even greater flexi-
bility in designing pay packages. The four-year minimum could be 
achieved, for example, by dividing compensation equally into current 
salary and stock or options that do not vest for eight years, by deferring 
all compensation for four years in whatever form or forms the company 
and executive choose, or through some other combination. 
 A term-only approach would permit greater diversity in compensa-
tion design and mitigate some of the harshest aspects the approaches 
considered above.165 Allowing firms to bind executives to the long-term 
fortune of their companies through accounting-based incentives and 
even deferred cash compensation would mitigate valuation and diversi-
fication problems inherent in approaches limiting incentive pay to eq-
uity-based instruments.166 A term-only approach would still have a one-
size-fits-all aspect, but the greater flexibility for compensation design 
should mitigate inefficiencies and reduce the incentive to circumvent 
the regulation.167
 A term-only approach might have an adverse effect on executive 
conservatism, however. As we have seen, extending holding periods for 
equity pay increases the gap between shareholder cost and executive 
value.168 As a result, the flexibility to choose between instruments 
would tend to result in a less risky basket of instruments and greater 
executive conservatism.169 Naturally, the degree to which compensation 
risk would be reduced would depend on the length of term imposed. 
Requiring executives to hold pay until retirement would result in a 
much greater shift away from risk than requiring that a fraction of pay 
be held for, say, five or six years. 
 Given the risk of excessive conservatism, it is not certain that term-
only approaches would always be superior to instrument-specific regu-
lation aimed at combating short-termism. Nonetheless, if regulation is 
                                                                                                                      
165 See supra notes 95–160 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes 105–121 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 122–160 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. 
169 In addition, a term-only approach of this nature continues to focus only on the 
“flow” of incentives, not the sum total of incentives created by other equity holdings, pro-
motional aspirations, and the like. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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to be undertaken, policy makers should consider term-only approaches 
as alternatives to existing instrument-specific proposals. 
B. Disclosure-Based Regulation 
 This Article has focused on compulsory regulation aimed at im-
proving the link between executive pay and long-term company per-
formance, and, to the extent that short-termism is a result of market 
myopia and/or externalities, it seems likely that some degree of coer-
cion probably would be needed to effect change.170 Enhanced disclo-
sure of executive pay practices, for example, is unlikely to result in firms 
increasing holding periods if shareholders prefer the current arrange-
ments. Unfortunately, highly coercive regulation carries the greatest col-
lateral risks and costs. One-size-fits-all regulation inevitably involves some 
over-inclusiveness, and firms have little choice but to comply with com-
pulsory regulation.171
 On the other hand, to the extent that short-termism is driven by 
managerial myopia and agency problems, there might be a useful role 
for enhanced disclosure.172 Were it not for the opacity of complex and 
diverse compensation arrangements, so this story goes, boards and 
shareholders would adjust compensation arrangements to increase the 
link between executive wealth and long-term company performance 
(or at least the link between executive wealth and company solvency). 
 The average holding period of pay discussed in the previous sub-
section might provide a reasonable basis for a disclosure-based re-
gime.173 In order to avoid the type of circumvention that plagued the 
SEC’s former piecemeal executive pay disclosure requirements, disclo-
sure of the term of executive pay should be comprehensive, and disclo-
sure of an average holding period that includes every element of com-
pensation would be comprehensive.174
                                                                                                                      
170 See supra notes 25–29, 37 and accompanying text. 
171 Of course, one way of ratcheting down the potential harm of such regulation is to 
lower the stakes by converting compulsory rules into tax or tax-like incentives. Unfortu-
nately, as we have seen, previous attempts at using the tax code to regulate executive pay 
have been less than fully successful. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 166–169 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. The other negative consequence of 
disclosure of executive pay amounts was an upward ratcheting in the value of pay pack-
ages, but there is no reason to think that the term of executive pay would be subject to a 
Lake Wobegon effect. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. Arguably, better ex-
ecutives should be paid more, but not more quickly or more slowly than their peers. 
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 One can, in fact, imagine a range of possible disclosure metrics ex-
tending from a simple weighted average holding period, which would 
serve as a measure of protection against bet-the-company risks, to more 
complex measures involving both the term of pay and sensitivity of pay 
to performance. The potential benefits of such disclosure would include 
facilitating comparison between firms on the extent to which executive 
pay packages are focused on the long term, providing baseline data and 
context to administrators evaluating more coercive regulatory propos-
als, giving outside directors ammunition in negotiating pay packages 
with senior executives, and giving shareholders who have a “say on pay” 
a consistent basis for evaluating the term as well as the amount of execu-
tive compensation proposed by the board of directors.175
 A disclosure-based approach to combating short-termism would 
minimize the collateral damage from regulation, but disclosure alone is 
unlikely to have the same effect on compensation design and short-
termism as more coercive regulation. That is the tradeoff. Whether it is 
a good tradeoff depends on the extent and ultimate source of the short-
termism problem. Given the considerable uncertainty on both counts, 
however, caution is warranted in drafting any potential regulations. 
Conclusion 
 If combating earnings manipulation and reckless short-term behav-
ior were the only issues involved, crafting a regulatory response to short-
termism would be a fairly easy task. It is not difficult to bind executive 
wealth to long-term firm performance and deter managers from risking 
the solvency of their companies. But shareholders and policymakers 
care about more than solvency. They are also interested in the efficiency 
of compensation and in encouraging executives to take appropriate 
                                                                                                                      
175 “Say on pay” procedures give shareholders an advisory, up-or-down vote on executive 
compensation. As of March 2009, nineteen U.S. companies had voluntarily adopted “say on 
pay” procedures, and large numbers of shareholders have voted in support of “say on pay” at 
many other companies. See Ted Allen, “Say on Pay” Gets 62% Support at Hain Celestial, Risk-
Metrics Group Risk & Governance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2009/03/say-on-
pay-gets-62-support-at-hain-celestialsubmitted-by-ted-allen-publications.html (Mar. 12, 2009, 
12:10 EST). ARRA requires TARP recipients to submit executive compensation to an annual 
non-binding shareholder vote. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(e)(1)–(2) (West 2001, Supp. 2009 & 
Supp. I 2009). There is also support in Congress for requiring “say on pay” more generally. 
See Stephen Labaton, Democrats Seek Shareholder Voting on Executive Pay, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 
2007, at C2 (noting the House debate on a bill that would give shareholders the right to a 
nonbinding vote on the pay packages of senior executives of public companies as well as on 
“golden parachute” compensation awarded to executives during negotiations over the pur-
chase or sale of a company). 
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risks that maximize the long-term prospects of companies. These con-
flicting priorities result in a difficult balancing act, too difficult, perhaps, 
to be the subject of one-size-fits-all, coercive regulation. 
 Nonetheless, despite the lack of empirical evidence, the author 
shares the view that executive pay probably is too focused on the short 
term systemically, as a result of managerial agency problems and opac-
ity, and thus is among those frustrated by the barriers to fruitful coer-
cive regulation. So what else can be done to reduce short-termism? 
First, we can work to mitigate the underlying agency problems through 
improved board structure and governance practices,176 and we can di-
rectly address the other potential underlying causes of short-termism, 
such as market myopia, through education, market reforms, and im-
proved reporting.177 Second, we can employ less coercive means of en-
couraging firms to increase the long-term focus of executive pay that 
will minimize unintended consequences. Comprehensive disclosure of 
the term of executive pay might be one approach. Another would be 
increased pressure on firms from congressional committees and proxy 
advisors to extend incentive holding periods.178 Persuasion would be 
more effective, of course, if also backed by empirical evidence linking 
longer incentive holding periods with reduced executive risk taking 
and enhanced firm performance. Reforming executive compensation 
is no easy task and legislators should proceed with caution, seeking im-
provement, but forgoing radical measures that jeopardize economic 
growth. 
                                                                                                                      
176 See, e.g., RiskMetrics Group, U.S. Corporate Governance Policy 2009 Updates 
4–13, 22–33 (2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009 
PolicyUpdateUnitedStates.pdf (outlining board structure and governance best practices). 
177 See, e.g., Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 Fin. 
Analysts J., May–June 2005, at 65, 70 (proposing improved corporate performance re-
porting, focused on accruals, as a means of reducing obsession with quarterly results). 
178 Currently, proxy advisor RiskMetrics Group’s statement of executive compensation 
best practices includes only vague language that five-year equity vesting “do[es] not neces-
sarily provide a long-term focus” but that forcing executives to hold stock until retirement 
“can encourage a long-term focus.” See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 176, at 28–29. 
